"Beware the double entendre" would be a good slogan to su mm arize a recent article by Reuben Hershone that ends by enticing the reader to make up slogans w ith some w ords that have technical mathematical as well as ord inary language meanings.' The point of his creative exercise is to have the reader encounter and perhaps int ernalize what Hersh views as an importan t lesson that ma y account for difficulties studen ts have in learning mathematics: that ordinary language is not only filled with ambiguous meanings, but that even when there is no ambiguity in ordinary language, there is generally either no connection or a ten uous one between that meaning and the mathematicalone.
As an example of a tenuous connection, Hersh comments, If 1 say "I own a number of calcu lus books...," 1 don't mean zero books....I don't even mean one book....I mean two or more (p.48).
Hersh claims that he no w understand s that it was not mere ignorance that accounted for the comment ma ny years ago b y one of hi s stu de n ts who asserted that zero was not a number.
Hersh offers a litany of other ordinary language expressions that are at odds w ith mathematical meaning: adding (which in ord inary language always leads to an increase in number), difference (signaling a comparison in ordinary language, but not necessarily subtraction), multiplication (repeated ly adding so that one arrives at some thing that is bigger than what was initially the case ).
He points ou t that not only objects and operations but the logic of requests or demands is problematic as well.
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Thus when we ask someone to sho w that a number divisible by six is even, it is surely appropriate in ordinary usage to choose one example (like forty-two) to d emonstrate the point rather than to come up with some ge neral proof.
The connection between mathematics and ordinary language can be even more tenuous however in advanced mathematics, as Hersh p oints out. He comments:
.
In ad vanced mathematics, there's more linguistic confusion. Surds (absurd), irrational and imaginary numbers, singular perturbations, d egenera te kernel s, strange attractors-all sou nd d angerous, undesirable, things to avoid
It is true that the mismatch between mathematical and everyday meanings is significan t enough to warrant our attention, and a disinclination to appreciate this observation may very well account for problems stud ents have in appreciating mathem atical m eaning. There are, how ever, concomitan t issu es that are either ignored or distorted by Hersh 's program to clear up the intended entendre-with the int ention of minim izing ambiguity. They are issues th at have deep consequ ences not onl y for stu dents attemptin g to learn new bodies of know ledge, but for anyone attempting to appreciat e the nature of mathematical thought as well as its intellectual history.
For this purpose, 1 would like to suggest the following complementary slog ans:
Precision of meaning is one thing. An appreciation for the evo lu tion of ideas and the associated labor pains is another. The slogan "Be Awareof (rather than Beware) the Double Entendre" is intended to have an ameliorative rather than a dismissive quality with regard to the concept of double entendre. What do I have in mind? While Hersh has found out that some students have trouble understanding a concept like that of irrational or imaginary numbers because they seek association with such words which "sound dangerous, undesirable, things to av oid ," I have di scovered that many are fru strated by a di sinclination to take seriously the ord inary language equivalent.
Take the case of " neg a tive number" for exa mple. Whil e "negative" surely fits the bill of sound ing dangerous and is so mething to avoid (unless of course it is associated with a biopsy), the Latin translation of that concept (which pre-dated the English translation) wa s just as forebod ing and perhaps more revealing.
These numbers were originally called numeri fictimeaningfi ctitious numbers. The implication here is not onl y that these n umbers are dangerous, but that they reall y d o not exist-or if th ey do, their existence is shrouded in mystery.
What can stu dents learn not by disassociating from an English translation, but by embracing su ch translations with an historical and multicultural perspective? Perhaps th e deepest lesson to learn is that they are not fools if they do not immediately understand what the concept is all about. No t singly, but taken as a whole, words like "negative, " "imaginary," "irrational," "complex" with regard to numbers sign al some thing very important. That is, they suggest that the se concepts evolved against considerable resistance. They may come to appreciate that in a quite deep sense, "ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny." If our st udents have trouble understanding how n umbers are extended, then it w ould be a significant source of so lace for them to appreciate that they are me rely experien cing the labor pains of these ideas historically.
And why shoul d these ideas hav e had such a labor intensive birth? Wh y were the y not just accepted as reasonable extensions of existing knowledge? What does it mean to say, as Hersh points out, that mathematician s appreciate that zero may have meaning in the above context while ordinary language suggests 6 the opposite? Who are these mathematicians that appreciate the m eaning? Are we referring to those who gave birth to the ideas and found th em selves walking on a tight-rope, or are we referring to a twentieth century embodiment of "mathematician ?" Are there present day mathematicians who would have difficulty with the concept of zero defining a number of real world objects? Should there be? One reason that each of the extensions of numbers (beyo nd natural numbers-those that Kronecker spoke of as God-given, but which Russell and Frege attempted to humanize by establishing them on a settheoretic foundation) met with such resistance among professionals is that there was an important and healthy kind of confusion that had to be unraveled over time. It is a sort of confusion that is not easily conque red once and for all, but is perhaps built into the human mind, and reappears with each new discovery in all field s of inquiry. That is, in viewing an extension of already existing concepts, how d o we connect with what exists? What do we expec t of the newly emerging idea that is in common with th e previous one?
Obviously a concept (of number, for example) which derives from an earlier one has something in common with the earlier one. Just as obviously, however, it differs from the original one. Each extension requires that we decide how much we want the emerging idea to deviate from the originaL At what point is th e deviation so significant that w e can no longer speak of th e two concepts in the same breath?
With each extension of number, mathematicians had to ask themselves what there wa s that was so fundamental about the concept from which it w as to be derived that had to be held intact-such that letting it go w ould completely destroy the concep t.
At ea rly stages in the history of mathematics, extensions were characterized by mathematicians' search for a "v isible" thread-something linked to the real world, or perhaps a model of some sor t that might be a bit more abstract than what could be touched or seen. Just as mathematicians who were confronted with the search for some reality that linked the emerg ing concept of numerifieti to the ear thiness of the na tural numbers, so our students experience discomfort when the y cannot rely upon familiar models in a number system that is supposedly an extension of what is already comfortable.
We sometimes get the impression that an axiomatic formulation of mathematics was a watershed that enabled mathematicians to resolve this problem once and for all. We thus might conclude erroneously that it is our students' inability to appreciate an axiomatic perspective that accounts for their relu ctan ce to accept some of these extensions. We m ight believe that the culprit then is an overly "concrete" hold on the prior number system, and furthermore that the concrete hold is rooted in an effort to connect each idea with ord inary language usa ge. Thus if natural number is associated with objects you can see or touch, then it su rely is und erstandable that our stu dents would have a problem that mathematicians do not have with zero or ne gative elements being numbers at all.
But the problem does not (and did not) disappear with the creation of an axiomatic perspective. If we think of the natu ral numbers as a system satisfying Peano's postulates, then we know that there are certain axioms that such a system must satisfy. But as we extend this system, we find ou t tha t som e of the properties must be relinquished. It is not just that we cannot " touch" negative numbers that is problematic, but rather that the extended system loses some properties of number that are associated with the positive integers and such properti es are cherished by different people in different ways. If the extension from positive integers to integers enables us to solve some new equations, it also raises som e eyebrows. Thus, in the extended system we can no longer hold on to mathematical induc tion (a loss felt perhaps more dramatically in gu ise of the equivalen t well-ordering property). Not every subset of the new system has a least element. Similarly, an awareness that is perhaps more intuitively understood (with machinery that may sound less technical than mathematical induction) is challenged to the hilt when an extension from positive to negative rationals leads us to reject the stro ngly he ld belief that a sm aller number divided by a larger number cannot equal a larger nu mber divided by a smaller one (as in~]/1 = 1 /~1 ) .
When do we reach a point of no return-such tha t we no longer think of the newly derived system as being a number system at all? We know that the deeply embedded property of commutativity had to be reH umanistic Mathematics Network Journal#1 5 linquished under matrix multiplication. Yet, we ha ve come to think of matrices as being a number system of sorts.
As we depict the actual evolution of number systems, we can share with our students the historical deb ates that took pla ce regarding the legitimacy of purported extensions. But we can do more. If w e en gage them in creating alternative extensions-ones that challenge some of their own cherished properties-at what point do our students get their backs up and say that the system being created no longer reflects what numbers are "really about"?
That's the sort of question that can engage our students, once we encourage them not to by-pass the ambiguity of ordinary lan gua ge and to place mathematics on a different sort of pedestal, but rather to see how the presence of language in the evolution of ideas is a testimony to the most human problems of cogrution and emotion as well: How badly do we want something that opens up totally new avenues to explore, and at what price will we buy it?
BE AWARE OF MULTIPLE ENTENDRE So far, we have shown how attention to double entendre can be advantageous not from the point of view of making each new concept more easily understood, but rather as a tool in enabling us to better understand the problematic nature of an entire collection of concepts.
There is however another way in which attention to ordinary language can be enlightening. This has to do less with the translation (and mistranslations) of a family of words and grammatical uses in the domains of ordinary language vs. mathematics, and more with an awareness of certain concepts that are embedded in our culture in general.
It lead s us to an issu e alluded to in the above section, but it puts a totall y new slant on the issue. I begin with the story of a classroom event of sev eral years ago.
I was teaching a talented group (sic) of graduate students who had previously been exposed to a number of different strategies for extending number systems. Thus, they had postulated newly extende d number systems; they had derived new systems from old ones mak ing use of concep ts such as ordered pairs of elements from the old ones; they had proved all sorts of things about the new systems in relation to the old ones; they knew what the concept of equivalence relation was all abo ut and had seen the relevance of that concept to extensions; they had been exposed to the concept of new systems having a subset isomo rp hic to the old; the y ha d been exposed to alternative historical develop ment of the real numbers as in the case of Dedekind's cuts vs. Weier strass' limits.
I then proposed the follow ing (wha t I thought wa s) simple d ilemma :
The real numbers can be characterized in an axioma tic way (essentially an Archimede an orde red field, but I was careful to lay out the properties ). I reviewed for them that wit hin that system, it is possible to prove that there does not exist a number x so that xl =-1.
I then told them tha t one "popular " way of viewing the set of complex num bers is to define that set as a one that satisfies all the properties of the previous se t, but in addition has the followin g property:
There exists a number x so that r =-1.
Q uestion: How is such a contrad iction possible? I found their ans w ers perple xin g. Many of them claimed that the ne w set. the complex numbers, was a different set than the pre viou s one-the real numbers-so that there was no implied contradiction.! Some people seemed to believe that the problem wa s resolved by naming the new system-as if such an act in and of itself had the power to di ssolve a contradi ction . Some claimed that it is not surp rising to find out that what we p reviously held to be impossible was in fact possible since that is ana logous to what growing up and being educated is all about.
Many other interesting comments were mad e, and in fact, encou raging students to an alyze this sort of qu estion in a non-threatening way serv ed as a wonde rful Rorschach test. By examining anoma lies in a specifi c rather than in a globa l con text, ins tru ctors ma y unearth some interesting student misconceptions. That is, if asked whe ther or not it would be accep table to have a system that satisfies the two propositions X and not X simultaneously, they most likely would claim that such is not possible, and in fact is an important element in the arsena l of mathematical argumen ts. Now there is a grain of truth in the students' reactions, an d I perhap s misin terpreted the ir efforts to resolve the probl em, but I still found it difficult to understand how they could not be bothered by what appeare d to be an obvi ous contradiction. In fact, no one menti oned that the new system of complex numbers is not merely an add-on to the old system in the sense that everything that w as assumed in the old system was also introduced into the new.
It is not tha t no one pointed ou t that in the new system, an important property of the old one must be relinquished (that of orde r), but rather that no one even entertained the possibility tha t something might be lost even if the y could not name what it w as. Why is that? It took me a long time to come to appreciate wha t might have been going on, and I have finall y come to an hypothesis that seems worth takin g seriously.That is, I have come to believe that their disinclination to consider the possibility tha t some thing had to be relinquished is a functi on of one rather specific notion of progress in our cu lture. Adapting a phrase of Piaget's that has a slightly different connotati on, I ha ve dubbed th is noti on of p rogress The American Phenomenon. While there are multip le meanings of progress in ordinary language, a dominant one seems to assume that progress involves getting more and more of what youfind desirable (like bein g able to get a solution to x 2 = -1 wh en it did not previously exist) without ever losing anything that you previously held worthwhile.
The fact that an extens ion of a numbe r system provides you w ith something new and desirable but may at the same time d eprive you of something you previously found desirable is not well understood . But why so? It may not be a resul t of the fact that the technical process of exten sion is poorly understood from a mathemati cal point of view, but ra ther because the concept of progress in gen era l is filled wi th so many unexplored myths.
So, I am sugges ting that it is not that we need to di stingui sh (and divorce) ordina ry language from p re-cisc mathe matic al language in orde r to create a mo re accurate under standi ng of mathematical ideas. Rathe r it is wort h doing some analysis of words and concepts in ordinary language that do H otatall have mathematical counterparts, but that strongly influen ce the way in which our students th ink abou t ma the matics and mathem atical de velopment in the first pla ce. Progress is one such concep t bu t there are other s.
What is needed in orde r to fully appreciate that exten sion of systems ma y have a price to pa y is not only an issue of mathematical logic. It requires simultaneou sly that w e do some excavation on a concept of ordinary language that is popularly viewed as unambiguous: the concept of progress. Once more, what we need is to seek greater rather than lesser ambiguity in order to arrive finally at a view of the concept of progress that illuminates the interesting discomfort w e feel when popularly held principles have to be relinquished.
I conclude with one other concep t that is a meta -mathematical rather than a mathematical one. Sometimes it is our inability to appreciate fully the ambiguity of ordinary language that prevents us from understanding not only a particular mathematical concept or an array of concepts, but rather the nature of mathematical thought itself. Consider the concept of definition.
Most of m y students believe that definitions in mathematics are arbitrary. That is, they tell me that you can define things any way you want.
Holding on to a narrow and unambiguous notion of definition, they essentially see its application in mathematics as the replacement of one arbitrary English word with some mathematical formu lation. Thus the slope of a line in a Cartesian co-ordinate system is meant to be a shorthand way of replacing the change in y va lues di vided by the change in x values for an y two points on a straight line.
What the concept of arbitrary definition neglects to appreciate is first of all that no one goes around just defining things arbitrarily and that considerable spade work is necessary in ord er to decide what is worth de fining in the first place. That is, definitions single out objects with a purposein mind, and frequently that purpose is arrived at as a culminating act of inquiry rather than as a first step (as most texts would have us believe To adopt the notion of definition in mathematics as arbitrary is to show a lack of appreciation for the interesting range of ways the concept of definition functions in ordinary language. It is to act as if the Socratic search for "justice" or "beauty" is a pointless venture on the grounds that any shorthand expression would do.
Once more, it is ordinary language with all its ambiguity that provides a clue that the concept of definition in mathematics might not be as monolithic as we are led to believe when the claim is made that definitions are arbitrary and we can define anything any way we w ish.
CONCLUSION
So Hersh, in his delightful essay, reminds us that ordinary language can be misleading and can inter fere with students' understanding of mathematical id eas . That lesson itself, however, is misleading if we do not also take into consideration that ambiguity of language can be an asset, especially when the goal is not necessarily to unearth the preci se meaning of a rela-tively narrow mathematical concept (like negative integer), but rather to appreciate how it is that an array of related concepts (like number) has evolved.
It is by looking at the array of ordinary language meanings (and concomitant emotional baggage) associated with numbers that we can beg in to imagine a state of mind that was behind Kronecker's reaction to Lindemann's demonstration of the transcendental nature of pi: Just a litt le over a century ago, he said:
What good is your beautiful investigation regarding pi? Why study such problems, since irrational numbers do not exist?"
The pedagogical issues are complicated here and I have made no effort to spell this awareness ou t in terms of any teaching program. Furthermore, I have intentionally focused narrowly on the concept of number rather than upon the range of interesting specific concepts that Hersh has explored. I have also not explored in general the role tha t ordinary language plays in thinking, nor have I delved in particular into the role of metaphorical thinking in mathematics-a thinking that might account for the variety and richness of systems described by language such as "ring," "field," "ideal," and even "manifold " and "commutater. 2While having some surface validity, the problem with this way of resolving thecontradiction isthat Idid not construct the new system from the old (i n which case, this explanation could perhaps be justified). What I did was topostu late the newsystem so that I was not looking at the elements in the new system as having any existence other than what could be described by the axioms themselves. Though thisstrategy isfrequently used inextending systems, ithasaslippery enough quality so that Bertrand Russell was led tocomment:
The method of "postulating' what we want has many advantages; they are the same as the advantages of theft over honest toil. 
